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I. INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States corporate
landscape was struck by a series of high-profile scandals that rocked the capital
market and shook Wall Street at its very foundation. Following these scandals,
and in direct response to the fears they instilled in investors, Congress enacted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act or Sarbanes-Oxley)1 in July 2002.2
Supporters of the Act hoped it would usher in a new era in corporate
governance and restore investor confidence in publicly-traded companies and
the American capital market in general,3 while others criticized the Act as
being both hastily enacted4 and disproportionate in its scope to the problems
it sought to remedy.' Though commentators disagree as to the wisdom of the
Act, most agree that it has ushered in sweeping changes to the American
corporate governance regime. Recent discussions have focused on the Act's
impact outside the United States-specifically, on foreign and multinational
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to variously as Sarbanes-
Oxley, SOX, and the Act].
2 John Paul Lucci, Enron -the Bankruptcy HeardAround the Worldandthe International
Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REv. 211, 214 (2003).
Former SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, for example, testified before the House
Committee on Financial Services about the Act's "far-reaching" goals that "aim to restore
investor confidence in and assure the integrity of [American] markets." The Impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxtey Act: Hearing Before the Comm. On Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 21 (2005)
(testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts042105whd.htm. See also H.R. REP. No. 108-63(I), at 3 (2003),
reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1000 (recognizing that "a series of highly publicized financial
disclosure restatements by public companies... contributed to a crisis in confidence on the part
of the investing public" and acknowledging the "extreme urgency of restoring [that]
confidence").
4 See Jeff Flake, Congress Needs to Fix Hasty Mistake, ARIz. REPUBLIC ONLINE PRINT ED.,
Apr. 17, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/viewpoints/articles/0417flake0417.
html (labeling the Act a hasty response to reports of corporate governance problems and
criticizing it as being "as much an attempt to politically inoculate Congress as it was an honest
effort to improve corporate governance"); see also Lucia Peek et al., Sarbanes-Oxey Act
of 2002: Corporate Governance and Public Accounting Firms Oversight in NAFTA Countries
(Am. Accoun. Assoc. 2004 Mid-Atlantic Reg. Meeting Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abs
tract=489046 (describing the Act's purpose as being "to renew the public's confidence in
corporate financial reporting and to improve the regulation of the U.S. securities markets").
' Michael Alles et al., Commentary, The Law of Unintended Consequences?: Assessing the
Costs, Benefits and Outcomes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 INFO. SYS. CONTROL J., 2004,
available at http://www.isaca.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID= 16698&TEMP
LATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm.
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corporations. The various provisions of this American law have drawn praise
and criticism, as much internationally as domestically, and its effects-both
intended and unintended-have been felt far beyond the borders of the United
States.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the international effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley, to compare the corporate governance framework established
by the Act in the United States to governance regimes in other countries, and
to evaluate the desirability and feasibility of international harmonization of
corporate governance standards. Because of the breadth of the Act, its effects
have been felt across the globe. This Note, however, focuses on the impact the
Act has had on the corporations and capital markets in Canada and Mexico.
This Note begins by providing an overview of Sarbanes-Oxley, describing its
key provisions as well as the corporate governance failures Congress sought
to remedy with its passage. The remainder is dedicated to the international
effects of, and responses to, the Act. Part I provides a discussion of the
background to the Act, specifically of the events prompting reform, key
provisions of the Act, and a brief review of the Act's strengths and
weaknesses. Part III analyzes the effects Sarbanes-Oxley has had on foreign-
based companies that maintain listings on American stock exchanges. That
part focuses on three significant effects: the delisting effect, conflicts with
foreign laws, and the Act's role as a catalyst in encouraging other countries to
reexamine their own corporate governance regimes. Finally, Part IV discusses
the desirability and feasibility of achieving harmonization in corporate
governance standards at an international level.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Implosion of Enron as the Impetus for Reform
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed immediately in the wake of a series of high-
profile corporate scandals which revealed systemic failures in the American
corporate governance system.6 Thus, the full implications of the Act are best
understood in reference to the facts and controversies of the scandals to which
Congress was reacting by its enactment. No single set of facts weighed heavier
6 See H.R. REP. No. 108-63(I), at 11 (noting that "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [was] enacted
in 2002 in response to a series of large-scale corporate scandals at companies like Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, Global Crossing, Adelphia, and Rite Aid").
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on the minds of legislators than those surrounding the implosion of the Texas-
based energy company Enron.
Enron was created by the 1985 merger of Houston Natural Gas (HNG) and
InterNorth, a Nebraska-based energy company.7 At its naissance, Enron
controlled the largest natural gas pipeline system in the United States: 37,000
miles of pipelines extending from Texas to Canada and from Florida to
California.' Yet the new enterprise also faced some significant challenges.
First, because of the recent deregulation of the energy industry, Enron lacked
exclusive rights to its vast pipeline network.9 Second, the company was
burdened by significant debt incurred during the merger process.'l To
overcome these obstacles, Enron's Chairman and CEO, Ken Lay, brought in
Jeffrey Skilling, a former consultant "who had a background in banking and
asset and liability management."" Under their leadership, Enron flourished
throughout the 1990s, expanding aggressively 2 and earning much praise from
investors and analysts. 3 By 2001, however, not all was well behind the scenes
at the sixth-largest energy company in the world;' 4 on December 2 of that year,
7 Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron - The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOES AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 3, 11 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
8 ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 31 (2003).
9 C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall ofEnron, J. ACCOUNTANCY ONLINE, Jan. 2002,
http://www.aicpa.org/PUBS/j ofa/apr2002/thomas.htm.
'0 Vikas Bajaj & Kurt Eichenwald, An Enron Chapter Closes: An Obituary; Kenneth L.
Lay, 64, Enron Founder and Symbol of Corporate Excess, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at C7.
" Thomas, supra note 9.
12 Skilling's solution was the creation of the energy derivative, a program whereby "Enron
would buy gas from a network of suppliers and sell it to a network of consumers, contractually
guaranteeing both the supply and price, charging fees for the transaction and assuming the
associated risks." Id. The gas bank was eventually expanded into an electricity bank in 1996,
and in 1999, Enron launched an internet commodities-trading website that by 2000 was
averaging 6,000 daily transactions valued at $2.5 billion. Enron Timeline, CHRON.COM (2002),
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/1l27125.html [hereinafter Enron Timeline].
Enron also expanded internationally during this time, acquiring pipeline networks in South
America, opening offices in England, and constructing power plants in England and India. Id.
13 Each year from 1996 to 2001, Fortune magazine branded Enron "America's most
innovative company." Van Niel, supra note 7, at 11. In 2000, the Financial Times named Enron
"energy company of the year" and "boldest successful investment decision." Rise and Fall of
an Energy Giant, BBCNEwS, Nov. 28,2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/l681758.stm.
Investors' satisfaction was evidenced through share prices, which peaked in August of 2000 at
$90.56. Thomas, supra note 9.
14 Enron Timeline, supra note 12.
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Enron became the largest company in American history to declare
bankruptcy.' 5
What exactly went wrong at Enron is a question that is easier asked than
answered. There are, however, several instances of illegal and unethical
conduct by corporate managers that contributed to the company's demise; it
is clear from the Act's prohibitions that these problems were fresh in
legislators' minds.' 6
First, Enron employed a series of transactions with special purpose entities
(SPEs) in order "to manipulate reporting, hide debts, and hide poor-performing
assets" from investors, creditors, and regulatory authorities.' 7 Though the use
of SPEs is legal and, in fact, common among companies that desire to finance
risky deals "without increasing the risk exposure of the main company," the
manner in which Enron dealt with SPEs was not consistent with legitimate
uses of such entitites.1" First, the SPEs Enron dealt with lacked independence,
as most were controlled by Enron CFO Andrew Fastow, and thus should have
been consolidated on Enron's financial statements. '9 Second, Enron used its
own stock to guarantee its transactions with the SPEs; accordingly, it was able
to keep debts and failing assets off its books despite the fact that the ultimate
15 JoHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK § 2:2.1 (2005).
16 See, e.g., Kenji Taneda, Survey, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States
Securities Regulation, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 715, 734 (2003) (noting that "[t]he major
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley follow the nature of the scandals" that preceded the Act's passage,
and identifying several examples of that correlation: "Chief Executive Officer ('CEO')/Chief
Financial Officer ('CFO') certification of financial statements (sections 302 and 906), a
requirement that all companies listed on an exchange or the Nasdaq have independent audit
committees (section 301), a prohibition on personal loans to directors and officers (section 402),
as well as restrictions on interim pro forma financial reports (section 401), and on insider trades
during blackout periods (section 306)").
"7 Van Niel, supra note 7, at 14.
18 Id.
19 Id. Under Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) guidelines in place prior
to 2003, a SPE was considered "independent" and was not required to be included on the
sponsoring company's financial statements if two conditions were satisfied: first, outside
investors must constitute at least 3% of the ownership interest and, second, that outside investor
(or group of investors) must exercise actual control of the SPE. Arlette C. Wilson & Walter M.
Campbell, Enron's Aggressive Accounting, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., July/Aug., 2000,
at 12. In 2003, FASB amended its rules to require a sponsoring company that is a "primary
beneficiary" of a SPE transaction to consolidate that SPE on its financial statements. FN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. INTERP. No. 46 (2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/fin46r.
pdf. It is worth noting that Fastow profited handsomely from his involvement with the SPEs,
receiving $30 million in management fees from 1999 to July 2001. Thomas, supra note 9.
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risk was still Enron's.2" Finally, exacerbating Enron's misuse of SPEs and
related-party transactions was the company's incredibly complex and dense
financial reports which made it difficult, even for trained analysts, to discern
the true nature of Enron's health.2
A second questionable practice was Enron's use of "mark-to-market"
accounting to report, as current profits, the money it expected in the future
from long-term energy contracts. 22 Mark-to-market accounting, like the use of
SPEs, is not prohibited; however, it is best suited for items that are easily
valued.23 These were new items that had never before been marketed or traded
in; accordingly, there was little information on which Enron could base profit
projections, and little information for investors and analysts to use to measure
the accuracy of Enron's reported projections.24 Enron's second misuse of the
mark-to-market accounting method, and one that "likely constitutes an
intentional misrepresentation," involved the company's failure to restate its
initial profit estimates when the contracts did not generate profits in
accordance with those projections, as required by generally accepted
accounting principles.
A third problem, and one that may have compounded the first two issues
described above, was that Enron's outside and supposedly independent
auditing firm, Arthur Andersen, operated under significant conflicts of
interest.26 Andersen received $52 million from Enron in 2000: half for audit
20 Van Niel, supra note 7, at 14. Because Enron transferred many of its failing assets to the
SPEs, the pledging of Enron shares as a sort of collateral was necessary to compensate the SPE
investors for the risk. Thomas, supra note 9. As the value of the assets parked in the SPEs
declined, Enron faced a growing obligation to issue additional shares. Id. This obligation was
a key factor in the company's decision to end its dealings with one group of SPEs-the so-called
"Raptors"--in October of 200 1, a move that piqued governmental interest in Enron's affairs, and
ultimately led to the company's demise. Id.
21 See Thomas, supra note 9 (discussing the "lack of transparency of Enron's disclosures"
and quoting one analyst's statement that" '[t]he notes just don't make sense, and we read notes
for a living' ").
22 Andrew Hill et al., Enron: Virtual Company, Virtual Profits, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002,
http://specials.ft.com/enron/FT3648VA9XC.html.
23 Id.
24 Van Niel, supra note 7, at 15. See also Hill et al., supra note 22 (noting that because
Enron applied the method to "assets, such as long-term energy contracts, in which there was no
transparent trading, Enron had to estimate fair value," and describing the ease with which the
company could overestimate profit margins for services "because no one could accurately predict
them").
25 Van Niel, supra note 7, at 15.
26 Id. at 17.
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services and half for consulting services, which largely consisted of advising
Enron how to structure business deals.27
Fourth, Enron misled regulators and investors by using stock option grants
to circumvent the prohibition against excessive compensation of executive
employees without treating those grants as expenses. 21 "Though not illegal,"
one commentator notes, "this practice allows the posting of financial data that
is not complete, especially in Enron's case, where stock options represented
a very large and important form of employee compensation. ''29
A final factor contributing to the heavy losses experienced by Enron
employees was the fact that for thirty days in the fall of 2001, Enron's
employees' 401 (k) pension plan was in a "blackout period during which plan
participants were prohibited from making inter-fund transfers within the 401 (k)
plan."30  The blackout was a consequence of the company's decision,
supposedly made well before it was announced in mid-October, to change plan
administrators for the 401 (k) plan." During this time, "Enron executives were
dumping all of their Enron stock, [while] rank-and-file plan participants could
only watch in horror as their life savings disappeared."32
27 Id. Mr. Van Niel goes on to posit that "Andersen's extensive consulting work for Enron
may well have compromised its independence and its judgment in determining the nature,
timing, and extent of audit procedures," and suggests additionally that the "consulting fees may
also have been lucrative enough to deter Andersen from asking Enron to make revisions to its
financial statements." id.
28 Id. at 16.
29 Id. Appropriate treatment of stock option grants would have reduced Enron's profits from
1998 through 2000 by approximately $188 million. Id.
30 Brian W. Berglund, Fundamentals of Employee Benefits Law: Securities Law Issues
Relating to Employee Benefit Plans (1), SM058 ALI-ABA 707 (2007). See also Ellen E.
Schultz, 'Lockdowns' of 401 (k) Plans Draw Scrutiny: Enron Employees 'Losses Suddenly Put
Practice in Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at CI.
a" Thomas, supra note 9. As to the timing of the decision, compare id (noting that "the
timing of the decision certainly has raised suspicions"), with Berglund, supra note 30 (describing
the proximity of this announcement with other announcements that drove down the stock price
as "entirely coincidental" and "one of the most spectacular applications of Murphy's Law in
history").
32 Berglund, supra note 30. During the blackout, Enron stock fell nearly $4 per share: before
the blackout it was trading at $13.81, and after the freeze was lifted, shares were trading at $9.98.
BOSTELMAN, supra note 15, § 2:2.2. Meanwhile, CEO Ken Lay sold over 2 million shares of
Enron stock in 2001, taking in over $100 million in the process, all the while reassuring
employees and investors that the company's highest priority was restoring investor confidence
and raising stock prices. Floyd Norris & David Barboza, Enron 's Many Strands: Ex-Chairman's
Finances; Lay Sold Shares for $100 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at A1.
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Enron's story is disturbing even standing by itself. However, investors and
observers quickly learned that Enron's problems were not isolated. From 2000
to 2002, there were at least twenty-one other similar scandals at companies
including WorldCom, Global Crossing, AOL Time Warner, and Tyco
International.33 The loss to the investors and employees of the affected
companies was tremendous: when the dust settled, shareholders were out
nearly $500 billion.34 Public confidence in corporate managers and outside
auditors and attorneys was virtually non-existent, and by October 9, 2002 the
S&P 500 Index fell to half of its (record high) value on March 24, 2000."5 It
became clear that Enron was "the result of significant structural weaknesses
in institutional corporate governance and accountability models combined with
a lack of personal ethics and integrity."36 Congress immediately set out to
fortify these structural weaknesses and to restore investor confidence in both
the markets and corporate governance, and in July 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley was
signed into law.37
B. Sarbanes-Oxley's Solution to Corporate Governance Failures
Sarbanes-Oxley has been described as "one of the most influential-and
controversial-pieces of corporate legislation ever to have hit a statute book"3
and as "without a doubt ... the single most important piece of legislation
affecting corporate governance, financial disclosure and the practice of public
3 See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM, Aug. 26,2002, http://
www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html (listing and briefly describing many of
these scandals).
" Lucci, supra note 2, at 211-12. For example, Enron's 21,000 employees, who "reportedly
had an average of 62% of their [retirement] plan balances invested in the Enron stock account,"
suffered devastating losses with the plummet in Enron's stock price and ensuing bankruptcy.
BOSTELMAN, supra note 15, § 2:2.2. Enron's 401(k) plan, which in 2000 contained nearly $2.1
billion in assets (mostly in the form of Enron shares), dropped in value by 94% in 2001. John
Paul Lucci, Note, New York Revises Ethics Rules to Permit Limited MDPs: A Critical Analysis
of the New York Approach, the Future of the MDP Debate After Enron, and Recommendations
for Other Jurisdictions, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 151, 192 (2003).
" John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING
CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US 1, 1 (John
Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006).
36 GOVERNING THE CORPORATION: REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE
OF SCANDALAND GLOBALMARKETS 22 (Justin O'Brien, ed., 2005) [hereinafter GOVERNING THE
CORPORATION].
" Lucci, supra note 2, at 214.
38 Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2005.
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accounting" since the Great Depression.39 The Act's eleven titles address
seven categories: "public disclosure of financial information and regulation of
insider conflicts, corporate governance matters .... regulation of auditors, new
rules for attorneys, responsibilities of ancillary gatekeepers, such as rating
agencies, miscellaneous provisions ... , and remedies and penalties."40
Sarbanes-Oxley applies with equal force to domestic and foreign
companies, although there are some exceptions contained in the Act for foreign
issuers and accounting firms.4 However, the Act's provisions do allow for
varying degrees of compliance based on a foreign company's contacts with the
United States:
Generally, if a non-United States company has no contacts with
the United States... and has no contractual agreement to comply
with SOX, then SOX jurisdiction does not reach such
company.... Compliance with SOX's criminal provisions ... is
required of non-United States companies if such companies have
"business only" contacts in the United States and have no
securities listed on a United States exchange.... Full compliance
with the provisions of SOX is required for any non-United States
company whose securities are listed on the NYSE, the American
Stock Exchange[,] or NASDAQ.... Additionally, non-United
9 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sarbanes-Oxley and Strategies for Compliance, http://www. pwc.
com/extweb/newcoatwork.nsf/docid/DOD7F79003C6D64485256CF30074D66C (last visited
June 4, 2008).
40 BOSTELMAN, supra note 15, § 3.1. It should also be noted that Congress was not the only
institution to affect change in the regulatory regime. In 2002, almost simultaneously with
Congress's passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, American stock exchanges such as the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ also undertook efforts to review and revise their own
listing rules to achieve similar goals in good corporate governance. Id. § 2:8.
"' Taneda, supra note 16, at 735 ("[I]t appears that Congress intended Sarbanes-Oxley to
provide for identical treatment of domestic and foreign issuers."). One notable exception,
discussed below, is the extension of deadlines for compliance with Section 404 for foreign
private issuers. Similar waivers have been debated for smaller companies who are, it is
presumed, less susceptible to scandal (at least those on the scale of Enron's, with which
Sarbanes-Oxley is primarily concerned) as well as less able to shoulder the significant costs
associated with compliance. Marie Leone, Small-Company Execs Sound Off on 404, CFO.cOM,
Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6767953/c_2984409/?f=-archives. Section 106(c)
also contains a provision whereby the SEC or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) may exempt foreign public accounting firms from any provision of the Act. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 106(c), 116 Stat. 745, 765 (2002).
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States companies... that have filed a registration statement with
the SEC are required to fully comply with SOX.
42
Title I of the Act is directed towards improving the regulation of auditors
of publicly traded companies. It creates the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB or the Board), a private, non-profit corporation
charged with registering, inspecting, and overseeing the auditors of public
companies in order to prevent the re-occurrence of the Enron and Arthur
Andersen scandal, and adopting and modifying standards to guide auditors in
fulfilling their duties.4 3 Furthermore, the Board has the ability, as does the
SEC, to bring enforcement actions and sanctions against companies it finds to
be in violation of its adopted accounting principles." Thus, the Act's
provisions are subject to quasi-judicial interpretation through the rule-making
processes of these bodies.
Title III contains reforms aimed at corporate responsibility. First,
section 301 requires that publicly-listed companies maintain independent audit
committees.45 Section 302 requires the chief executive and financial officers
42 Dawn S. Richter, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Non-United States Issuer, in
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 295-97(Dennis Campbell & Susan
Woodley eds., 2004).
4' Elizabeth Donald & Sheirin Ghoddoucy, Interview, Corporate Governance andSarbanes-
Oxley "Post- 'Post-Enron "' -An Interview with Professor Thomas Joo of UC Davis School of
Law, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 24 (2006); see also The Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, http://www.pcaobus.org (last visited May 13, 2008). Section 101 of the Act requires the
PCAOB to develop a continuous program of auditor oversight "in order to protect the interests
of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate and
independent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for,
public investors." Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101.
" Donald & Ghoddoucy, supra note 43. See also GOVERNING THE CORPORATION, supra
note 36, at 22-23 (identifying key powers of the PCAOB, including those to "conduct
investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning, and impose sanctions upon, registered
public accounting firms and associated persons of such firms," and to "enforce compliance by
registered public accounting firms and their associated persons with the Act, the Board's rules,
professional standards, and the securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit
reports and the obligations and liabilities of accountants").
4' But see Donald & Ghoddoucy, supra note 43 ("There are two big questions about
these... committees. First, what is meant by 'independent'?... The definition of independence
under Sarbanes-Oxley has been criticized. For example, the directors of audit committees are
not supposed to draw any money from the corporation except in their capacity as director. But,
they're still being paid by the corporation to be a director and a member of the committee.
Second, does independence do any good? "Independent directors" often means 'outside
directors' - people who... [b]y definition.., don't work day-to-day in the corporation. So the
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to certify (and accept personal responsibility for) the accuracy of the
company's financial statements. a6 Section 306, a direct response to the insider
trading by Enron executives during the lockdown of employee retirement-
savings plans, prohibits such conduct and provides remedies in the event such
conduct occurs.4 7 Similarly, section 401 is directed toward improving
transparency and accuracy in reporting the use of SPEs and similar off-
balance-sheet transactions designed to artificially inflate profits on financial
statements while exposing investors to risk. 8
Section 404 requires company certification of internal controls, and has
drawn more attention-and criticism for being prohibitively expensive to
comply with-than any other single provision of the Act.49 In response to that
criticism, especially complaints that smaller and foreign companies should not
be expected to shoulder those costs, in 2004 the SEC announced that it would
extend the compliance date for all issuers to July 2005, and in March 2005
announced that it would again extend compliance date for foreign private
issuers and non-accelerated issuers another year, to July 2006.50
C. Commendations and Condemnations of Sarbanes-Oxley
As stated above, Sarbanes-Oxley has been both heralded and criticized
since its enactment.5' Critics label the Act "hastily conceived"5 2 and
question is, do these people have the relevant expertise to be able to determine whether the
auditor is doing a good job? And even if they do, do they have the backbone to stand up to the
board?").
46 William J. Carney, The Costs ofBeing Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going
Private, " 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 144 (2006).
47 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 306.
48 Id. § 401.
41 Id. § 404; see also Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., The Missing Link in Sarbanes-Oxley:
Enactment of the "Change of Control Board" Concept, or Extension of the Audit Committee
Provisions to Mergers and Acquisitions, 63 Bus. LAW. 81, 87 (2007) (noting that "there have
been significant complaints about the operation of many provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
principally section 404").
50 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Extension of Compliance Dates for Non-
Accelerated Filers and Foreign Private Issuers Regarding Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting Requirements (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-
25.htm.
S See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate
Governance in the Post-Enron, Post- WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REv. 65, 72-74 (2006) (briefly
reviewing "praise and criticism for SOX").
5' Jose 0. Garcia Mata, Changing Role of Mexican Accounting Firms and of the Comisario,
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characterize it as a rushed effort by lawmakers faced with mid-term elections
to respond to public outcry and maintain constituent support. 3 Others lament
the end of an era during which the SEC appeared to be taking a more
"internationalist" approach to securities regulation, believing the Act to herald
in a new unilateralist approach to regulation.54
Many of the most vocal critics of Sarbanes-Oxley are foreign issuers.
Following the enactment of the Act, then-EU Commissioner Bolkestein wrote
a letter to then-SEC chairman William Donaldson objecting particularly to the
creation of the PCAOB, and urging that the "registration of EU audit firms
[with the PCAOB] is unnecessary, burdensome, and disproportionate because
the EU has already equivalent systems in place that deal with registration,
oversight and external quality assurance of auditors which are continuously
being improved at EU and national level."55 Commissioner Bolkestein's
concerns-specifically that international solutions such as this should
recognize attempts by other countries to regulate similar conduct-are
representative of concerns shared by many foreign issuers in Europe, and
elsewhere.56
The extension of the section-404 compliance date is one example of a larger
criticism of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. One professor observes the logical
fallacy of trying to remedy and prevent egregious (and, in many instances,
knowing and willful) breaches of corporate governance rules by passing new
corporate governance rules, because:
and Response to Sarbanes-Oxley, 12 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 49, 49 (2004). See also Kalani A. Morse,
Much Ado About Nothing: Looking Past the Drama of Sarbanes-Oxley and Reevaluating the
U.S. De-listing Trend Among Non-U.S. Firms, 2 INT'L L. & MGMT. REv. 87, 88 (2005) (noting
that following the Enron/Andersen scandal, "[t]he U.S. Congress reacted in an
uncharacteristically swift manner").
" See, e.g. Sen. Paul Sarbanes, Living Up to Its Promise: Sarbanes-Oxley Pays Dividends
byKeeping Companies Honest, ROCKYMOUNTAINNEwS, Apr. 8,2006, at2C (discussing a Wall
Street Journal editorial criticizing "[t]he mad rush to pass [the Act] in 2002 [as being] less about
keeping business honest than... about keeping congressmen in office").
" Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes A broad to Regulate
Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REv. 849, 856 (2004).
" News Release No. 27/3, European Union, EU Concerned About U.S. Audit Registration
Step (Apr. 24, 2003), available at http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2003/2003027.htm, as
cited in Maria Camilla Cardilli, Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on
European Companies, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 785, 808 (2004).
56 See generally Cardilli, supra note 55 (discussing European reaction to passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley).
[Vol. 36:647
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
looking at Enron, one of the problems was people simply
ignoring the regulations.... You can pass whatever rules you
want; slimy people are still going to break them. One way you
can prevent people from breaking existing regulations is to
enforce those regulations more strictly. I think it probably would
have been better to crack down on enforcement of existing
regulations, rather than to pass more of them that ultimately
won't be enforced.57
Similarly, Professor Davis observes the "puzzling" means chosen to combat
the perceived Enron failures, noting that "[i]t is almost as if Congress is
saying: [Enron] should have done better, so all corporations should recreate the
Enron board and try harder."58 Finally, the sheer scope of the Act has been
criticized: Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy analogized the Act's
attempt to prevent corporate malfeasance to throwing "buckets of sand into the
gears of the market economy.
59
In the years since the Act's passage, its supporters have been just as vocal
as its critics. While some critics complain about the costs of compliance, some
CEOs have recognized that at the end of the day, the law's provisions might
serve to improve corporate efficiency and productivity.60 Moreover, in a 2005
survey of 200 financial executives, 42% described the Act as a "way to
improve [their] business controls and processes," and 44% believed the law
was a "net gain to investors."' Also, there are efficiency and consistency
arguments in favor of a centralized, coordinated legislative corporate
governance scheme; as one PriceWaterhouseCoopers executive noted,
"Executives credit Sarbanes-Oxley with providing a consistent, formalized
structure for corporate governance and control." 62 Finally, many proponents
7 Donald & Ghoddoucy, supra note 43.
s Ronald B. Davis, Fox in S-OX North, A Question of Fit: The Adoption of United States
Market Solutions in Canada, 33 STETSON L. REV. 955, 977 (2004).
'9 Del Jones, Sarbanes-Oxley: Dragon or While Knight?, USATODAY, Oct. 19,2003, at lB.
Echoing McNealy's sentiments was Overstock.corn CEO Patrick Byrne, saying that "[a]s a
general rule of thumb, any bill that passes the United States Senate 97-0 is probably a horrible
idea." Id.
60 Id.
61 Amey Stone, SOX. Not So Bad After All?, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 2005, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2005/nf2005081_7739_db016.htm.
62 Janet Whitman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Begins to Take Hold, Survey Says, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 25, 2003, at C9.
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point to evidence that the Act, despite its shortcomings, is actually achieving
the goals it was designed to accomplish:
Since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, public trust and confidence
in the capital markets have increased and many aspects of
corporate governance have been modified. Needed changes in
auditor relationships with clients have taken place as a result of
more active and effective audit committees. In addition, [CEOs
and CFOs] are increasing their attention to key governance,
internal control, and financial reporting issues. New internal
control requirements, while not without cost, are adding value for
many companies. The PCAOB's inspections of audit firms are
finding areas where audit quality can be significantly improved.
Finally, many entities not covered by the Act have voluntarily
implemented similar practices.63
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF SARBANES-OXLEY
Because Sarbanes-Oxley applies to any firm-domestic or foreign-that is
listed on an American stock exchange, its effects are not confined to the
territorial borders of the United States. As of April 30, 2008, there are 414
non-U. S. issuers listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), representing
forty-five countries.64 It would be impractical to examine the effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley in each of those forty-five countries; instead, this Note focuses
on the impact the Act has had in Canada and Mexico. These countries are
63 GOVERNING THE CORPORATION, supra note 36, at 24. See also Sarbanes, supra note 53
(discussing a Financial Times article by two former Goldman-Sachs partners that found that the
Act's reforms "have led to a 10 percent improvement in the corporate governance performance
of large U.S. companies compared with their foreign counterparts" and commenting that "[t]he
finance and audit committees of corporate boards are taking their roles much more seriously and
imposing greater accountability on their members"), and Morse, supra note 52, at 89 (noting the
rhetoric surrounding the Act but "posit[ing] that the SOX drama has been somewhat beneficial
by shocking the global community into heightened levels of accountability, fostering a strong
and expanding culture of responsible and transparent corporate governance").
"414 NYSE-listed Non-U.S. Common Issuers from 45 Countries, http://www.nyse.com/
pdfs/08nonUSIssuers.pdf (last visited June 3, 2008) [hereinafter Non-U.S. Common Issuers].
As of December 31, 2007, when there were 421 non-U.S. issuers on the NYSE, these foreign
companies represented a market value of approximately $11.4 trillion. NYSE Euronext, Non-
U.S. Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/intemational/nonuslisted/int-listed.html
(last visited June 3, 2008).
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important partners in business, trade, and investment with the United States,
and securities of issuers from each country are traded on U.S. markets.
65
This Note addresses three prominent international effects of Sarbanes-
Oxley. First is the delisting effect-the concern that Sarbanes-Oxley's
stringent requirements will have a deterrent effect on foreign firms'
willingness to list on American exchanges.66 Second is the problem of
conflicts between the Act's provisions and foreign laws to which cross-listed
companies are subject.67 For example, a German company with stock traded
on both American and German exchanges is subject to both nations' regulatory
regimes; when inconsistencies in those laws cannot be reconciled, the issuing
company is left in the unpleasant situation of having to choose which set of
rules to violate and with which set to comply. 68 Third, the Act has (arguably)
had an unintended catalytic effect of encouraging other countries to evaluate
and, where necessary, reform their own corporate governance rules.69
A. The Delisting Effect
One criticism of Sarbanes-Oxley is that, by increasing corporate
responsibility and the costs of compliance, it provides disincentives for firms
to list on American exchanges, and creates incentives for those who are
already registered in the United States to delist, in order to avoid those costs.7"
6' Non-U.S. Common Issuers, supra note 64. Of the 414 non-U.S. issuers listed on the
NYSE as of April 30, 2008, seventy-seven are Canadian and seventeen are Mexican. Id. As of
April 6,2008, there are 304 foreign firms listed on the NASDAQ, including forty-nine Canadian
and three Mexican companies. NASDAQ, NASDAQ Non-U.S. Companies Spreadsheet,
http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUSDownload.asp (last visited June 3, 2008).
66 See generally Morse, supra note 52.
67 See generally Ian L. Schaffer, Note, An International Train Wreck Caused In Part by a
Defective Whistle: When the Extraterritorial Application of SOX Conflicts with Foreign
Laws, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1829 (2006). A cross-listed company is one with securities listed
on exchanges in multiple countries. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global
Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89 (2007) (discussing the cross-listing trend and proposing different
regulation of foreign companies that are cross listed).
6 See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 67.
69 See, e.g., Jason Thompson, The Paradoxical Nature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act As it
Relates to the Practitioner Representing a Multinational Corporation, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 265, 279 (2006) ("The lack of uniformity among E.U. nations and conflict between the
[Sarbanes-Oxley Act] and E.U. data protection laws place multinational companies in precarious
positions.").
70 Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 289, 293 (2003). If a firm desires to exit from the U.S. market, going
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These concerns are especially acute with respect to small and foreign
companies.7 The delisting effect is a product of the essentially contractual
nature of American securities markets: by accepting the benefits of being
traded on a U.S. exchange, a corporation-whether foreign or domestic-must
accept the corresponding obligations imposed by American securities laws,
including Sarbanes-Oxley.
7z
Clearly, a company is free to elect not to trade its shares on an American
exchange in the first instance. With respect to those companies that are
already traded on U.S. exchanges and seek to delist, however, there are several
obstacles to the delisting process that create strong incentives against delisting.
First, avoiding Sarbanes-Oxley means actually deregistering with the SEC, not
simply removing a company's stock from active trading on an exchange. 73 The
deregistration process, in turn, requires that the issuer certify that it has less
than 300 American shareholders; if the number of American shareholders
climbs above 300 within eighteen months of the issuer's completion of
private is an option, but a firm that desires to remain publicly held has options in order to do so.
See Martin C. Daks, Companies 'Go Dark' to Avoid SOX Compliance, N.J. L.J., Aug. 3, 2006,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=l 154509535896. It may trade
on a foreign exchange, or it may trade on a quotation medium such as the Pink Sheets, and thus
avoid the SEC's disclosure requirements. Id; see also Vagts, supra, at 293 (noting that "a side
effect of Sarbanes-Oxley may be to enhance the volume of transactions on, and hence prosperity
of, stock exchanges outside the United States"), and Carney, supra note 46, at 152 (describing
the London Stock Exchange's successful attempts to recruit firms who desire to avoid the costly
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance). Daks notes that companies traded on the Pink
Sheets, "instead of providing more information to investors ... provide none," supra, and
Professor Carney describes the Pink Sheets as a "poor substitute for the more complete and
instantaneous information of other trading systems." Carney, supra note 46, at 143. For a
further discussion of the Pink Sheets, see generally PennyMarkets.com, A Little About the Pink
Sheets, http://www.pennymarkets.com/pinks.shtml (last visited June 3, 2008).
71 See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding The Impact of
SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 703, 729 (2007) ("All told, SOX 404's costs should soon be a
relatively minor concern for large public companies. However, its costs are potentially very
burdensome for small firms, a fact that has created much controversy and induced the SEC to
repeatedly postpone SOX 404's application to smaller firms.").
72 See Vagts, supra note 70, at 293 (noting that foreign "firms listed on [American]
exchanges... can be held to have consented to" regulation under American securities laws).
71 Morse, supra note 52, at 96; see also Robert C. Pozen, Can European Companies Escape
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deregistration, the issuer will find itself again subject to SEC reporting
requirements and, thus, Sarbanes-Oxley.74
Above and beyond the difficulty of accomplishing delisting and
deregistration with the SEC, there are compelling reasons why a firm may elect
not to attempt to do so. First, a delisting firm that intends to remain publicly
held will have to explain to shareholders decision to exit the U.S. market;
where those reasons involve a desire to avoid compliance with an Act designed
to promote good corporate governance practices, shareholders might rethink
the desirability of their investment. Conversely, issuing companies from
countries lacking strong corporate governance regimes can reassure their
investors of the soundness of their business, accounting, and governance
practices by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the rigorous standards of
Sarbanes-Oxley."
A second disincentive for a firm to delist in order to escape Sarbanes-
Oxley's ambit stems from the global trend toward increased corporate
responsibility: while it might avoid SOX by listing on a foreign exchange, it
will likely face increased regulation wherever it decides to list.76 Moreover,
even where foreign requirements are in fact less stringent than Sarbanes-
Oxley's, the benefit a firm will receive from switching trading markets may not
ultimately outweigh the costs associated with that switch, which include the
delay associated with deregistering with the SEC and adjustment costs such as
those associated with researching potential new markets."
A fourth reason a firm would not want to exit U.S. markets is the unrivaled
access to expert and specialist investors afforded to participants in American
" Morse, supra note 52, at 97. With respect to deregistration and delisting, see generally 17
C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2 (2005).
" See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, U.S. Capital Markets in the
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World: Why Our Markets Should Matter to Foreign Issuers, Speech in
London, England (Jan. 25,2005) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch
012505whd.htm).
76 For example, "Marco Ventoruzzo, legal counsel to the Italian stock exchange,
characterizes SOX rules as 'not so different from those in Italy.'" Morse, supra note 52, at 117.
Morse discusses reforms in Mexico and Japan that subject companies in those countries to
requirements similar to Sarbanes-Oxley's. Id. at 119-23.
" This concern is especially relevant if investors are less willing to invest in markets where
they receive less protection, in which case the costs of switching markets would also entail some
degree of lost investors. See id. at 110 (stating that "[i]nvestors are far more likely to invest in
non-U.S. firms insofar as they can rely upon the assurances and security provided by SEC
registration and its accompanying compliance requirements").
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markets.7" Finally, although compliance with the Act does entail costs, a hasty
decision to delist overlooks the fact that many of the Act's provisions
encourage good business practices.79
Since Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment, there is empirical evidence that some
firms have chosen to exit the U.S. market.80 There is similar evidence that
other firms have chosen not to enter the U.S. market because of the costs
associated with regulatory compliance.8' It is more difficult, however, to
obtain comparable evidence as to what proportion of the delisting trend is
attributable to Sarbanes-Oxley."2 Some delisting issuers have made it clear
that the decision to delist was motivated in part or in whole by a desire to avoid
compliance with the Act.83 Other companies, however, "clearly recognize the
71 See id. at 100, 110 (noting that "many large international firms clearly recognize the value
of maintaining unfettered access to U.S. capital markets" and also that U.S. markets are attractive
to foreign issuers because of their size and the "access to millions of affluent investors"
afforded).
" Id at 110. For further discussion of these, and additional, disadvantages to delisting, see
Brad Jacobsen & Chris Scharman, Going Dark- A n Alternative to Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance,
UTAH BAR J., Apr. 26, 2007, http://webster.utahbar.org/barjournal/2007/04/going dark an al
temative to s.html (identifying as potential disadvantages of delisting "reduced liquidity of a
company's stock; reduced ability to use a company's stock as currency in acquisitions; perceived
loss of prestige; potential to make stock-based incentive plans less attractive to employees; loss
of access to the capital markets to raise money;.., not having audited financial statements and
complying with certain of the requirements of SOX may make a company less attractive as a
potential acquisition target or for future financings; .. .the substantial risk of shareholder
litigation regarding the decision to go dark; potential loss of stock value and, even if the
company maintains trading status on the Pink Sheets, lower trading volumes; and no payments
are made to shareholders in connection with the loss of liquidity that going dark will bring").
80 At the end of 2003, there were 467 foreign issuers on the NYSE, including twenty-three
Mexican and seventy-eight Canadian firms. 467 NYSE Non-U.S. Listed Issuers from 50
Countries, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/03nonUSIssuers.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). By
April 30, 2008, the total number of non-U.S. issuers has fallen to 414, of which seventy-seven
are Canadian and seventeen are Mexican companies. Non-U.S. Common Issuers, supra note 64.
8 German companies Porsche and Dr. Ing, Japanese company Daiwa Securities Group, and
the British company Cambridge Silicon Radio all cancelled pre-existing plans to register with
the SEC, citing the increased costs of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley. Carney, supra note 46,
at 152-53 (2006); see also Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and
Economic Effects of Voluntary SECDeregistrations (U. Pa. Wharton Sch., Working Paper No.
04-19, 2004), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/04/0419.pdf.
82 See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 54, at 857 (observing the difficulty of identifying a single
cause of the delisting trend because, for example, ordinary business cycles and a worldwide
recession likely affected some companies' decisions to delist).
83 For example, "[h]ardware wholesaler Moore-Handley... said [in October 2003] that it
was taking the necessary steps so that it won't have to comply with Sarbanes, including delisting
itself from the Nasdaq exchange." Jones, supra note 59. Moore-Handley's CEO estimated that
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value of maintaining unfettered access to U.S. capital markets[,]" and have
chosen not to delist.84 Though it is not clear what role Sarbanes-Oxley has
played (and continues to play) in the delisting trend, there is enough evidence
that the SEC continues to exhibit concern. In 2006 it set up an advisory
committee to study the Act's effects, and in April of 2006 that committee
recommended that businesses with equity capitalization of $787 million or less
be exempt from complying with certain of the Act's provisions.8 5
B. Conflict and Overlap with Foreign Laws
Many of the companies that do not elect to exit the U.S. market by delisting
also maintain listings in other countries. Being subject to multiple sets of
regulations, an issuer might find itself facing provisions that irreconcilably
conflict with each other.8 6 In these instances, the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction
to enforce American laws is especially controversial in light of concerns of
extraterritoriality and comity.s7 These concerns are further exacerbated in
cases where the relevant foreign country has in place a comparable set of
corporate governance rules aimed at regulating the same abuses that Sarbanes-
Oxley was designed to regulate.
compliance with the Act would cost the fin-which earned $300,000 in 2002-$250,000. Id.
Similarly, a 2004 survey of 113 U.K. firms that maintained listings in both the United States and
the United Kingdom revealed that several firms planned to delist from American exchanges,
despite the SEC's willingness to stagger the dates of compliance with Section 404, because the
costs of maintaining those registrations outweighed the perceived benefits. Morse, supra
note 52, at 95-96.
84 Morse, supra note 52, at 100. In 2003, another CEO stated that his company, Pervasive
Software, which had $39 million in revenue at the time, would maintain its listing because it
anticipated fast growth in the future. Jones, supra note 59.
85 Daks, supra note 70.
86 Often corporate governance conduct prohibited under the more stringent Sarbanes-Oxley
Act is legal under the regulatory laws of another country. For example, one commentator notes
that "[i]n Australia, compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley would violate Australian law." Lucci,
supra note 2, at 243.
87 Mindora D. Vancea, Exporting U.S. Corporate Governance Standards Through the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Unilateralism or Cooperation?, 53 DuKE L.J. 833, 833, 860 (2003).
Extraterritoriality refers to the ability of a country to regulate behavior outside of its territory
through application of its laws, while comity refers to a nation's willingness to "[recognize] the
legislative acts of another nation." Id. See also Vagts, supra note 70, at 289 ("Both official and
unofficial commentators abroad have objected to portions of the law as overextending the reach
of American control.").
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The fact that inconsistencies exist between American and foreign
regulations does not mean that those inconsistencies are necessarily
insurmountable. The PCAOB has engaged in consultations and discussions
with both regional and national regulators in Europe (at the regional level with
European Commission regulators, as well as at the national level with
regulators from individual countries), Canada, Australia, Japan, and France."8
Additionally, regulatory agencies in other countries have demonstrated some
willingness to provide guidance to their issuers. For example, in response to
concerns raised by French cross-listed corporations about a conflict between
Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower protections and French law, France's
Commission Nationale de l'Informatique, a data protection agency, issued
guidelines for companies to follow in crafting their whistleblowing
mechanisms in a manner consistent with French privacy laws.89
In those instances where the Act is not inconsistent with foreign laws, it
frequently poses a second problem to foreign issuers: many of Sarbanes-
Oxley's provisions seek to regulate problems already regulated by foreign
laws, so it is both "unnecessary and inefficient for the U.S. to impose its own
corporate governance regulations" on such issues.9" Duplicitous regulation
creates the possibility of future difficulties of compliance with two sets of rules
rather than one and also increases the costs associated with such compliance.9
C. The Catalytic Effect
In addition to the effects, described above, that Sarbanes-Oxley has had on
individual companies subject to its provisions, there has been discussion of
whether the Act has had a broader, more macro-level impact on international
corporate governance. Although the corporate scandals prompting the Act's
88 GOVERNING THE CORPORATION, supra note 36.
89 Dugie Standeford, Decision Said to Accommodate US. Law but Leave EU Compliance
Unclear, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 3, 2006. The Act calls for the creation of"whistleblower channels"
for anonymous reporting of violations of corporate accounting and auditing laws. Id.
" Vancea, supra note 87, at 842. Two examples of such duplicity, discussed below, are the
mandate of CEO and CFO certification of financial reports and the requirement that companies
adopt financial reporting procedures and disclosure controls; these requirements are found in
both Sarbanes-Oxley as well as in rules promulgated by Canadian Securities Administrators
(CSA). Ontario Secs. Comm'n, Multilateral Instrument 52-109, available at http://www.osc.
gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20040326_52-109-cert.jsp (last visited
June 3, 2008).
9' Vancea, supra note 87, at 842.
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passage were largely unique to the United States in 2002,92 as that changed, the
Act began to function as a catalyst for other countries to reexamine their own
corporate governance regime.93 One observer, forecasting this effect early
after the Act was enacted, predicted that the Act would "become the
benchmark against which every otherjurisdiction's corporate governance rules
are tested."94 The role of Sarbanes-Oxley as catalyst for reform in both Canada
and Mexico, is discussed in turn below.
1. Canada
Canadian lawmakers responded quickly to Congress's enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley and in 2004 enacted a similar series of reform measures.95
The Canadian laws are, in some respects, replicas of Sarbanes-Oxley's
provisions, though in other instances there are important modifications
accounting for the structural and cultural differences existing between the two
countries." Primarily, Canadian lawmakers perceived these reforms as a
convenient way of ensuring the continuance of preferential access to American
capital markets.97 Being a response to American reforms, rather than a
response to corporate scandals, the Canadian laws represent more ofan attempt
92 No country, or even region, experienced corporate scandals on the same scale as the
United States did prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Nevertheless, Europe experienced
a similar scandal surrounding the collapse of dairy giant Parmalat in 2003. For a discussion of
the Parmalat scandal and its revelations regarding European corporate governance failures, as
well as implications for reform in Europe, see Claudio Storelli, Note, Corporate Governance
Failures - Is Parmalat Europe's Enron?, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 765, 766 (2005).
93 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 52, at 118 (describing the trend of homogenization of best
business practices and noting the "trailblazing effort" of the United States in passing Sarbanes-
Oxley and the reasonable expectation that other world economic leaders will follow suit).
9' Andrew Sawers, Act Brings Greater Accountability, FIN. DIRECTOR (U.K.), Oct. 1,2002,
at 51. Likewise, Morse suggests that "SEC enforcement efforts and the criminal sanctions
associated with noncompliance will promote SOX mandates as the gold standard or, at the very
least, as a reliable proxy against which to compare all other corporate governance standards."
Morse, supra note 52, at 117.
95 See TARA GRAY, PARL. INFO. & RESEARCH SERV., CANADIAN RESPONSE TO THE U.S.
SARBANEs-OxLEY ACT OF 2002: NEw DIRECTIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (2005),
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prbO537-e.pdf(discussing the
Canadian reforms and comparing them to Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms).
96 Id.
9' Id. This preferential access is important to Canadian issuers because "Canadian firms
make up the single largest group of foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges, with
approximately 15% of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) listed firms having a U.S. listing." Id.
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to maintain, rather than revive, investor confidence. Hence, there was less of
a sense of urgency in crafting and passing the Canadian reforms than in
passing Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Canadian reforms are more "non-
prescriptive" than Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions.98
Aside from the context in which the two countries' laws were passed, the
capital markets of the United States and Canada differ in several important
respects that make a "cut and paste" version of Sarbanes-Oxley unworkable in
Canada. First, Canada does not have a national regulatory body for its capital
market to rival the American SEC.99 Instead, securities regulation is subject
to provincial-not federal-legislation.' 0 In a country with different sets of
regulatory rules, many of the same concerns discussed in this Note are present
on a micro-level. Furthermore, enforceability is difficult where there is no
national regulatory agency to ensure compliance across provinces and
territories.
Second, the Canadian market consists primarily of thinly-traded companies
with little or no institutional investment. While relatively few American
companies have a single controlling shareholder, a much higher percentage
(over 25%, according to Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) estimates) of
Canadian firms have a single controlling shareholder.'0 ' Also, more than three
quarters of the companies on the TSX index have three or fewer shareholders
with legal or effective control of the corporation.10 2 Third, directorships of
Canadian corporations are far more interconnected than their American
counterparts: "[o]f the one hundred most profitable [Canadian] companies,
forty-five percent held ten percent or more of the shares of another company
on the list."'0 3 Fourth, Canadian companies are able to go public earlier than
American companies, and many Canadian publicly-held firms are small by
American standards."° Concerns therefore arise that imposing requirements
98 Id. at 5, 13.
99 Id. at 6.
"0 Davis, supra note 58, at 982. Although the Canadian provincial regulators together
formed the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), which develops instruments and policies
to be adopted by the provinces, this organization lacks the power of the SEC to pass rules that
are binding and enforceable without any further adoption by agencies or states. Id. at 982-83.
... GRAY, supra note 95, at 6.
'02 Davis, supra note 58, at 982.
'03 Id. at 983.
"04 GRAY, supra note 95, at 10.
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as stringent as Sarbanes-Oxley's would be an unworkable burden on many of
these companies.' °'
Finally, some commentators believe that reformers should seek to
accomplish their desired results through carrots rather than sticks: they argue
that a rules-based approach (such as that imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley) tends to
create an unhealthy "find the loophole" corporate mentality-a mentality that
can be avoided by instead implementing and incentivizing compliance with
voluntary guidelines and best standards. 0 6 The approach suggested by these
observers has the added advantage of leaving companies with the flexibility to
make day-to-day decisions in operating their businesses.0 7
One area in which the influence of the American experience was clearly felt
by Canadian reformers is the preparation taken prior to enactment. Canadian
lawmakers sought to avoid the confusion and uncertainty surrounding
Sarbanes-Oxley's passage, as well as criticisms of it being enacted too hastily,
by embarking on an extensive consultation process prior to enacting any
changes.'08 These reform efforts resulted in a series of national instruments
and policies promulgated by the CSA, and ultimately left to adoption by the
individual provincial governments.'0 9 Like Sarbanes-Oxley, the Canadian rules
call for CEO and CFO certification of financial reports and require companies
to adopt financial reporting procedures and disclosure controls." 0 They also
echo Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms of audit committees,"' and propose the
creation of a national accounting board analogous to the PCAOB.I"2
Following the promulgation of the CSA's instruments, the British Columbia
Securities Commission (BCSC) issued a notice refusing to adopt the CSA's
proposals on certification and audit committees, stating
105 Id. at 7.
106 Id.
1 7 Id. Given the differences between American and Canadian corporate structures,
philosophies, and capital markets, at least one commentator suggests that Canadian lawmakers
might have done better to look to the European Union for guidance, where the differences (at
least in capital structure) are less disparate. See Davis, supra note 58, at 955.
108 GRAY, supra note 95, at 7.
109 Id.
I Ontario Secs. Comm'n, Multilateral Instrument 52-109, supra note 90.
... Ontario Secs. Comm'n, Multilateral Instrument 52-110, available at http://www.osc.gov.
on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20040326_52-1 10-audit-comm.jsp (last visited
June 3, 2008). See also GRAY, supra note 95, at 11.
112 Ontario Secs. Comm'n, Multilateral Instrument 52-108, available at http://www.osc.gov.
on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_200401161012_52-108_ni.jsp (last visited
June 3, 2008). See also GRAY, supra note 95, at 11.
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that it viewed the certification requirement as a nuisance filing
because current regulation provided prohibitions on misleading
statements of the corporation's financial position with both
directors and executive officers being liable for any such
misrepresentation. [The BCSC] also had concerns about the
ability of directors to evade their present responsibility by
claiming reliance on the officers' certification. With respect to
the requirement for independent directors on audit committees,
the BCSC said it preferred using a combination of positive
general duties in the regulatory regime requiring a corporation to
have an audit committee and to disclose material information
about that committee's membership and their qualifications. " 3
The Canadian experience demonstrates some of the difficulties facing any
reformers. While Canadian reformers sought to avoid many of the problems
that plagued the American reform effort, they ultimately experienced a
different set of problems unique to Canada's peculiar corporate climate and
capital structure.
2. Mexico
Just as America's neighbor to the north has experienced effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment, so too has its southern neighbor. As one
commentator noted, "Mexico, an important participant in the regional and
global economies, is not immune to the side effects of the medicine being
administered to attempt to cure the ills of the U.S. crisis of confidence" in the
accounting profession and capital markets." 4 Because many Mexican
entrepreneurs have strong ties to American corporations, they have an acute
awareness of both the governance problems and solutions such as Sarbanes-
Oxley in the United States. Thus, even for those Mexican businesses that are
not legally bound to comply with the Act, it "has transformed the way Mexican
companies' CEOs and CFOs are looking at things.""' 5 Furthermore, because
of the ease with which money can cross borders, investment markets have
become increasingly competitive. Investors choose where to invest their
.. Davis, supra note 58, at 986-87.
14 Mata, supra note 52, at 49.
115 Thomas S. Heather, Current Issues in Corporate Governance for Mexican Companies,
Including Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley, 12 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 55, 57 (2004).
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money based on a number of different factors, but certainly investor
confidence will be stronger where there exists adequate safeguards against
corporate malpractice. Given that Sarbanes-Oxley implemented such
safeguards in the United States, the need for similar reform in Mexico was
soon apparent in order to maintain an active competitive corporate
environment." 6 One SEC Commissioner commented that "[t]he Mexican
government recognizes that in the global economy, investors must be
protected[, r]egulation similar to Sarbanes-Oxley will attract capital to their
economy" and, Mexican lawmakers hope, stop the delisting trend plaguing
Mexico's stock market as well as assuage skeptical investors' perceptions of
Mexico's markets as rigged."
7
In response to these pressures, particularly the need to remain competitive
in the global economy, Mexican lawmakers initiated their own efforts toward
corporate governance reform and increased investor confidence in the wake of
the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms in the United States."' Although many of the
regulations passed in 2003 were already in the making prior to the Enron
scandal and enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Act's passage in the U.S. did
put additional pressure on Mexican lawmakers to remove the issue from the
back-burner and hasten the pace of reforms.' Those efforts, directed
primarily toward remedying perceived inadequacies in corporate oversight and
enforcement, as well as toward making corporate governance more transparent,
culminated in December 2005 with approval by Mexico's federal Congress of
a securities market law, the Ley del Mercado de Valores (LM).
Additionally, just as American exchanges amended their listing requirements
and regulations, by 2004, Mexico's answer to the SEC, Comision Nacional
Bancaria y de Valores (CNB V), had amended its own rules to reflect some of
the changes made through, and in the wake of, Sarbanes-Oxley.' 2' Currently,
16 Morse, supra note 52, at 121.
... Josh Lyons & Kara Scannell, Mexico Moves to Toughen Up Securities Laws; Tries to
Attract Foreign Investors, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Dec. 8, 2005, at B17. See also Mata, supra
note 52, at 53 (noting "the need of Mexican public companies to implement strict corporate
governance practices to offset the perception that closely controlled companies have overriding
managements and boards of directors which remain exclusively an Old Boys' Club").
"' Lyons & Scannell, supra note 117.
119 Heather, supra note 115, at 58.
20 Creel, Garcia-Cudllar y Muggenburg, SAPIs to Promote Private Equity in Mexico, INT'L
FN. L. REV. (2006), available at http://www.iflr.com/?Page=17&ISS=21679&SID=624356.
The approval in the lower house was unanimous. Lyons & Scannell, supra note 117.
121 Mata, supra note 52, at 49. However, Mata notes that the new Mexican rules "fall short"
by failing to require some of the CEO and CFO certifications required by Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.
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there is no oversight body analogous to the PCAOB in Mexico; however, the
CNBV has initiated efforts toward the creation of such a body.'22 One
commentator notes that although the establishment of an oversight board in
Mexico is desirable, it "would require unavailable resources needed to attract
the required talents to conduct a professional and fair oversight function," and
suggests that for the time being this move bodes well for the future of Mexican
reforms.' 23 Additionally, following a series of crises in the mid-1990s in the
banking industry, the CNB Vin 2000 "exhorted public companies to voluntarily
adopt the recommendations of the Best Corporate Practices Code and required
formal reporting of the degree of adherence to the recommendations" designed
to promote good corporate governance.' 24 Based on corporate reports,
compliance with the regulations appears to be widespread, but commentators
have questioned the extent to which those corporate reports provide reliable
and accurate evaluations of compliance by the companies preparing them.'25
Just as Sarbanes-Oxley was subject to much criticism from the outset, the
LMVand related regulations have faced similar opposition. Billionaire media
mogul Ricardo Salinas Pliego,'26 led that opposition by criticizing the LMVas
at 50. The CNB V's auditor independence regulations are similar to Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions
in establishing "the concept of prohibited services such as bookkeeping, information systems
implementation and management, internal audit and legal services, management participation,
valuation and appraisal services and executive recruiting, in addition to the basic prohibition
against making investments in audited entities" and in regulating audit partner rotation,
appointment of auditors, and provision of non-audit services." Id. at 50-51.
122 Id. at 50.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 51.
125 Id. Mata's research indicates that, in 2002, 61% of issuers adopted the BCPC
recommendations on make up of boards of directors, and 88% adopted recommendations on
operation and duties of boards of directors. Seventy-three percent adopted recommendations on
disclosure of information to shareholders, and 87% adopted the recommendation that audit
committees' conclusions be validated by an independent auditor. The recommendation that rated
lowest in adoption by companies was that regarding the performance evaluation and
compensation of top management, adopted by only 49% of issuers as of 2002. However, he also
notes that the lack of meaningful guidance as to what documentation must be generated to
support adherence to these recommendations means that, in many cases, reported compliance
is based on subjective management interpretations rather than reliance on any objective criteria
to measure adherence. Id. at 52. See also Heather, supra note 115, at 56-57 (noting the
existence of "questions about the reliability of any so-called compliance statistics," but also that
"[a] majority of the Mexican companies on the [Mexican] stock exchange have adopted many
of the principals in the Code").
126 Salinas, the chairman of TV Azteca SA, Mexico's second-largest broadcaster, acquired
his fortune through "television, retail, and cellular services," and partially through inheritance;
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a "cut-and-paste" replica of Sarbanes-Oxley that, among other flaws, fails to
recognize the continuing importance of family-controlled businesses in
Mexico. 127  Salinas's objections, however, are not based entirely on an
objective concern about the inapplicability of the Act's provisions to the
Mexican economy: he is the first executive of a foreign company accused, in
the form of a fraud suit filed by the SEC, of violating Sarbanes-Oxley's
provisions. 28 Additionally, there are discussions of Mexican prosecutors
bringing an insider-trading case against Salinas, which would be the first in
that country.
29
IV. INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
STANDARDS
One criticism of Sarbanes-Oxley is that it was an American response to an
American problem, and that therefore it should not be applied to foreign
companies or, for that matter, relied upon by foreign countries in crafting
similar corporate governance regulation. However, in recent years that
argument has been somewhat undercut as other countries have experienced
corporate scandals similar to those prompting the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms. 3
Forbes ranks him as the 221st richest man in the world. #221 Ricardo Salinas Pliego &
Family, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2006 [hereinafter Salinas], available at http://www.forbes.com/lists/
2006/10/USK0.html.
127 Lyons & Scannell, supra note 117. The typical Mexican public company is controlled by
a small concentration of family members, and audit committees have found it difficult to
persuade family shareholders that reforms are worth the additional cost. Heather, supra
note 115, at 56-57.
128 Lyons & Scannell, supra note 117. See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Charges TV Azteca and Its Chairman-Ricardo Salinas Pliego-with Fraudulent Scheme to
Conceal Salinas' $109 Million Windfall Through Related Party Transactions (Jan. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-1.htm. The SEC allegations were that "he
bought the discounted debt of one of his outside holdings, Unefon, and then sold it back to the
company at face value. In doing so, he allegedly pocketed close to $109 million in the process
for himself and a partner" at the expense of shareholders. Salinas, supra note 126. Although
existing Mexican laws did not prohibit such a deal, the LMV would have required disclosure to
outside directors of Salinas's involvement in the shell company. Lyons & Scannell, supra
note 117. Without admitting or denying the charges against him, Salinas settled with the SEC,
agreeing to pay $7.5 million and never to serve as an executive or director of any company listed
on an American exchange. Elisabeth Malkin, Billionaire in Mexico Settles Case with S.E.C.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006.
129 Salinas, supra note 126.
130 For example, the collapse in 2003-2004 of Italian Parmalat brought with it the harsh
realization that Europe was not immune from corporate scandals, notwithstanding the loud
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Just as scandals have not confined themselves to a single country or continent,
neither have they confined themselves to a single type. The contours of the
Enron scandal were shaped by the culture and structure of the American
economy and capital market; foreign corporate scandals are likewise a product
of their own unique environments. Given that all scandals are not created
equal, the question arises whether a "one size fits all" solution is possible or
desirable. One commentator questions the ability of American laws to solve
problems peculiar to various foreign scandals, and suggests that foreign
companies that are already regulated by adequate foreign safeguards in their
home countries should be exempt from some of Sarbanes-Oxley's
provisions.' 3 '
A second argument against attempting international harmonization of
corporate governance rules stems from concerns of federalism,
extraterritoriality, and comity. First, corporate management in the United
States has traditionally been left to the states, and some have criticized
Sarbanes-Oxley for essentially commandeering the issue to the federal
government. '32 Additionally, there are the concerns about the Act's ability to
regulate conduct outside of American jurisdictions and the interference with
foreign governance rules that might occur through the application of Sarbanes-
Oxley's provisions to foreign companies. Third, as was witnessed on a smaller
scale by the CSA's unsuccessful attempts at achieving regulation
objections raised just two years prior by many European companies relating to the inapplicability
of Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions outside of the scandal-ridden United States. Storelli, supra
note 92, at 766-68. It appeared that Parmalat had forged documents attributing to the company
an almost $5 billion (43.9 billion) liquid account with Bank of America that never existed, and
failed to disclose almost $16 billion in debt. The situation came to light via a Bank of America
fax in December 2003, and was a harsh awakening to European regulators who believed
themselves to be immune to the corporate scandals that had plagued the United States economy
in 2002. Id.
131 Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Convergence to Comity in Corporate Governance Law:
Lessons from the Inauspicious Case of SOX, 1 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE No. 2
(2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=462142. Cunningham
acknowledges the difficulty in defining what safeguards are "adequate," but suggests that two
factors to be considered are: first, the existence of a comprehensive set of enforced securities
regulations; and, second, a lack of widespread scandals and corruption. Id. Countries that meet
Cunningham's criteria include Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., Japan,
Australia, and perhaps Israel. id.
132 Lisa Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of
Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 381, 381
(2005). See also Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate
Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 627-29 (2004).
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harmonization within Canada, harmonization among various countries could
prove unworkable.
Finally, there is no reason to assume that a solution to corporate governance
problems must necessarily materialize through legislation. First, the various
exchanges could set their own standards and rules, thus allowing companies
and investors to make decisions for themselves, based on their own perceptions
of each option's associated costs and benefits, about where to list and invest. 3 a
However, enforcement under this option might be problematic to the extent
that it is advantageous to have a single central enforcer like the SEC, rather
than leaving enforcement to each individual exchange. On the other hand,
maintaining a single enforcing agency such as the SEC, but having it enforce
different sets of rules against companies listed on different exchanges, is
equally inefficient and costly.
Another possibility would be to revert to a de-centralized corporate
governance regime. Until the 1930s, with the creation of the SEC and the
federal legislation and regulation that came with it, corporate governance was
an issue left to the states. However, by increasing the number of sets of
regulations and creating possibility for divergence among regulations in
various states, this problem could exacerbate already-existing concerns of
exposing companies to conflicting regulations. Additionally, the enforcement
concerns above are equally applicable to this option.
V. CONCLUSION
Sarbanes-Oxley, like any act of such breadth, has its advantages and its
disadvantages. While it has undoubtedly imposed costs on companies who
choose to trade their stock on American exchanges, it has also imposed
practices that, generally speaking, support increased corporate visibility and
accountability, and that protect investors against the type of corporate abuses
that were so prevalent at the end of the twentieth century.
Given the difficulties experienced by countries such as Canada in national
harmonization, international homogenization of regulatory rules would be a
daunting task. Because, however, other countries have followed the American
.3 Shortly after the Enron scandal, both the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ
amended their corporate governance listing standards to promote director independence, increase
the powers and requirements of the audit committee, and address other perceived failures in the
pre-Enron regime. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, NASD and NYSE Rulemaking:
Relating to Corporate Governance (Nov. 4,2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-
48745.htm. Many of these changes were similar to those undertaken by Sarbanes-Oxley.
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example in reforming their own regulations, and because American
enforcement agencies seem willing to work with foreign regulatory agencies
to make compliance easier for multinational firms subject to multiple sets of
regulations, harmonization may not be necessary, as long as clear incongruities
between Sarbanes-Oxley and foreign acts are either resolved or reconciled.
For all of its flaws, Sarbanes-Oxley did take important steps to rid the
American corporate environment of flagrant abuses by executives and
directors, and while the remedy chosen might have some significant side
effects, it appears, going on five years after its passage, that the Act is at least
a significant step toward the cure, and toward a healthier corporate culture in
the future.
